Abstract. Feistel Networks (FN) are now being used massively to encrypt credit card numbers through format-preserving encryption. In our work, we focus on FN with two branches, entirely unknown round functions, modular additions (or other group operations), and when the domain size of a branch (called N) is small. We investigate round-functionrecovery attacks. The best known attack so far is an improvement of Meet-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack by Isobe and Shibutani from ASIACRYPT 2013 with optimal data complexity q = r . It crosses the complexity of the improved MITM for q ∼ N e 3 r 2 r−3 . We also estimate the lowest secure number of rounds depending on N and the security goal. We show that the format-preserving-encryption schemes FF1 and FF3 standardized by NIST and ANSI cannot offer 128-bit security (as they are supposed to) for N 11 and N 17, respectively (the NIST standard only requires N 10), and we improve the results by Durak and Vaudenay from CRYPTO 2017.
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Introduction
Feistel Networks (FN) have been used in constructing many block ciphers such as DES [1] . In the classical FN, we construct a permutation from 2n bits to 2n bits with round functions from n bits to n bits. We call it as balanced Feistel network. Fig. 1 represents a 4-round FN with modular addition (modulo the size of the domain for a branch). Other well known types of Feistel networks are unbalanced FN, alternating between contracting and expanding round functions.
Although block ciphers only encrypt blocks of a fixed format (typically: a binary string of length 128), there are many applications requiring to encrypt data of another format (such as a decimal string of a given length) and to have encrypted data in the same format. For example, Credit Card Numbers (CCN) consist of 16 decimal numbers, whose 6 digits must be kept confidential. For this reason, these 6 digits are typically encrypted in digital transactions using a Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE). Recently, FPE based on FN [5, 6, 9] have been standardized [2, 3] . As an example, the FPE solution of the terminal manufacturer company Verifone encrypts about 30M credit card transactions per day in the United States alone.
In this work, we are specifically interested in FN with two branches (not necessarily balanced) with secret round functions and modular addition operation. Moreover, we are interested in small domain size over larger key space. We investigate the security when the round function is entirely unknown instead of a publicly known round function that mixes the input with a secret key (i.e. round function is F i = f i (k i , .), where k i is the round key in i th round). We do not assume that round functions are bijective. This applies to FF1 [6] by Bellare et al. and FF3 [9] by Brier et al. which have been standardized by The National Institute of Standards an Technology (NIST) published in March, 2016 [2] . This standard aims at a 128-bit security for any N 10. FF3 was broken and repaired by Durak and Vaudenay [15] . Herein, we denote by FF3
* the repaired scheme.
Fig. 1: 4-round Feistel network
Since their invention, Feistel networks and their security analysis have been studied. Many cryptanalysis studies have been done to give key-recovery, messagerecovery, round-function-recovery, and differential attacks on different types of Feistel networks [7, 12, 16, 18, 21, 25] . We summarize the best function recovery attacks in Table 1 . 1 The complexities are given in terms of number of encryptions. In Appendix, we present a brief survey of existing attacks. So far, the best generic attack was a variant of Meet-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack.
The most famous security result dates back to late 80's given by LubyRackoff [20] . In their seminal paper, Luby and Rackoff first showed that a three round Feistel construction is a secure pseudorandom permutation from 2n bits to 2n bits. Moreover, they showed that for more than three rounds FN, all generic chosen-plaintext attacks on Feistel schemes require q = Ω(2 n 2 ) queries where n is the input/output size to the round function. Information theoretically, the number q of queries provides 2qn bits of information. For r-round FN, we need rn2 n bits of information to recover the round functions (each round function can be represented with a string of size n2 n ). Therefore, q = r 2 2 n is enough to reconstruct the round function, in theory. Patarin [24] ). As we will not necessarily assume messages in binary, we use the notation N l , N r as the domain size of the round functions. We introduce some known attacks on Feistel networks with our focused properties: two branches with domain size N l and N r , with modular addition modulo N l and N r , secret random round functions which are balanced (N = N l = N r ) or unbalanced but with N l ≈ N r . 
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Our Contributions. In this work, we propose the best known generic exhaustive search attack on Feistel networks with two branches and random functions with arbitrary number r of rounds. We compare it with MITM. It is better for some parameters. When the data complexity varies in between the optimal (based on information theory) and the one of the codebook attack, our best time complexity
(based on partial exhaustive search, see Eq. (8)), where N is the domain size of the branch. More precisely, the optimal data complexity is q = r (2)). Our partial exhaustive search attack can use any data complexity from the optimal to the one of a codebook q = N 2 , but it is better than MITM for q > We plot in Fig. 2 the (r, N) parameters for which we have T Iter * = T MIT M * . As we can see, for any constant N and a low r (including r = 8 and r = 10 as the NIST standards suggest), Iter * is the best attack. The same figure includes two curves that correspond to the 128-bit and 256-bit security parameters (r, N). The curves are computed with the minimum between T Iter * and T MIT M * . It can be read that an intended 128-bit security level in FF3 * with r = 8, N 17 and in FF1 with r = 10, N 11 has not been satisfied.
2 E.g., for 6-bit messages and 2-digit messages. Another application could be to reverse engineer an S-box based on FN [8] .
Structure of our paper. In Section 2, we review the symmetries in the set of tuples of round functions which define the same FN and we describe the MITM attacks. Our algorithm is described and analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 applies our results to format preserving encryption standards. Finally, we conclude. 4 
Preliminaries
In this section, we present known techniques to recover the r-tuple of round functions in FN. Note that we actually recover an equivalent tuple of round functions. Indeed, we can see that round functions differing by constants can define the actual same cipher [13, 15] . Concretely, let (F 0 , . . . , F r−1 ) be a tuple defining a cipher C. For every a 0 , . . . ,
We obtain a tuple defining the same cipher C. Therefore, we can fix arbitrarily one point of F 0 , . . . , F r−3 and we are ensured to find an equivalent tuple of functions including those points.
Meet-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack
The MITM attack was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [10] . It is a generic known-plaintext attack. Briefly, consider an r round encryption E 0 , E 1 , . . . , E r−1 and corresponding D 0 , D 1 , . . . , D r−1 decryption algorithms. We assume each algorithm uses a k-bit key and we denote the keys by K 0 , K 1 , . . . , K r−1 . Let M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M q be the plaintexts and C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C q be the corresponding ciphertexts. Let the intermediate values entering to round i be M 
until round u. Then, these values along with their possible keys are stored in a table (The memory complexity is 2 uk messages). Then, the adversary partially decrypts the ciphertext C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C q for each value of the keys K r−1 , K r−2 , . . . , K u backward. Finally, the adversary looks for a match between the partially decrypted values and the rows of the stored table. Each match suggests keys for K 0 , K 1 , . . . K r−1 and the adversary recovers all the keys. The time complexity of the MITM attack is 2 (r−u)k and memory complexity is 2 uk .
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We can apply the MITM attack to the Feistel networks with r rounds and q known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In our setting, N is quite small, thus we can focus on a generic FN with functions specified by tables. This is equivalent to using a key of k = N log 2 N bits. Therefore, the standard MITM attack has a time complexity of N (r−u)N with same memory complexity. We label the time complexity as follows:
with q = rN 2 known plaintexts. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
Improved MITM
In this section, we elaborate and extend the attack mentioned briefly in [11, 12] on r-round FN. The same attack appears in [17, 18] with k = log 2 N. We are only adapting the algorithm to our settings. We take u = L so that we obtain N plaintexts. We do it q N times to obtain q plaintexts. Hence, we have q N values for a. We set the output of F 0 for one value of a arbitrarily. For all the plaintexts, we query (M
values. We enumerate all the functions of H, and compute (M
if u is odd. We store each Z in a hash table. We then enumerate all the functions of G, and
(for u odd), we look for a match in the hash table storing Z values (since they have to be equal). The time complexity of this approach consists of enumerating many values and functions with memory complexity vN log 2 (N) to store the hash table. Enumerating F 0 , (F 1 , . . . , F u ) and F u+2 , . . . , F r−1 gives N q N −1+(u+v)(N−1) tuples which are filtered by N −q . We obtain N q N −1+(u+v)(N−1)−q tuples. Thus, for each filtered tuple, we can deduce input/output values for F u+1 and rule out inconsistent tables to isolate the solutions (F 0 , . . . , F r−1 ). This post-filtering has a complexity N q N −1+(u+v)(N−1) . We will see that it is lower than the complexity of the rest of the algorithm. Thus, it disappears in the big-O. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 2. 2 )(N−1) for r is odd. We label the time complexity for described attack as:
, for r odd with q = rN 2 chosen plaintexts. We consider exhaustive search algorithms dealing with partial functions. Normally, a function F j is defined by its set of all possible (z, F j (z)) pairs. We call a table as partial table if it is a subset of its table. It is a set of pairs such that
If (x, y) ∈ F i , we say that F i (x) is defined and we denote F i (x) = y. The density of a partial table is the ratio θ of its cardinality by N. For example, θ = 1 N corresponds to a partial table defined on a single point z and θ = 1 corresponds to the full table. Our aim is to enumerate possible partial tables of increasing density by exhaustive search. So, we will "extend" partial functions. A partial table is an extension of another partial table if the former is a superset of the latter.
We deal with partial tables for each round function. We define r-tuples T of partial tables in which T j denotes the partial table of F j in T . 6 We say that T is homogeneous with density θ if for all j, T j has density θ. Similarly, a tuple T is an extension of T if for each j, T j is an extension of T j . An elementary tuple is a homogeneous tuple of density 1 N . This means that each of its partial functions are defined on a single point.
Again, our aim is to start with an elementary tuple and to list all extensions, as long as they are compatible (as defined below) with the collected pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts (M, C). We say that a tuple T encrypts a plaintext M i into a ciphertext C i (or decrypts C i into M i or even that T encrypts the pair (M i , C i )) if we can evaluate the FN on M i with the partial information we have about the round functions and if it gives C i . We say that a pair (M i , C i ) is computable except for r rounds for a tuple T if there exists a round number j such that the partial functions are enough to encrypt M i for up to j rounds and to decrypt C i for up to r − j − r rounds.
We want to define what it means for a tuple to be compatible with (M, C). Roughly, it is compatible if for each i, there exists an extension encrypting M i into C i . (However, it does not mean there exists an extension encrypting each M i to C i .) More precisely, we say that a tuple T of partial tables is compatible with (M, C) if for each i, at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(in this case, there is no need to extend T ); (ii) (M i , C i ) is computable except for two rounds or more (indeed, if two rounds are undetermined, we know that we can extend T to encrypt M i to C i ); (iii) (M i , C i ) is computable except for one round (numbered s below) and their is a match in the value skipping the missing round: more precisely, their exists s ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} and one (x, y) pair such that if
(indeed, we know we can extend the missing round with T s (x) = y).
Clearly, if no condition is satisfied for i, then no extension of T can encrypt M i into C i , so we can prune an exhaustive search.
Iter: Iterative Partial Exhaustive Search
Assume that q plaintext/ciphertext pairs (M i , C i ) are known to the adversary. Due to the symmetries in the set of tuples which are compatible with the codebook, we can focus on the tuples which are extensions of an arbitrarily fixed elementary tuple T 1 which encrypts the pair (M 1 , C 1 ). So, we define Pool i as the set of all extensions T of T 1 encrypting the pairs (M 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (M i , C i ), which are compatible with all other pairs, and which are minimal (in the sense that removing any entry in the partial tables of T makes at least one (M j , C j ) pair not computable, for 1 j i).
Algorithm 3:
3 Initialize Pool 1 = {T 1 }.
Initialize Pool i to empty. We iteratively construct Pool i . For that, we take all possible minimal extensions of tuples from Pool i−1 which encrypt the i th pair and remain compatible with all others. We proceed as defined by Algorithm 3.
With an appropriate data structure, we can avoid to retry to encrypt M j or decrypt C j and directly go to the next computable round (if any) in every pair. For each tuple T in Pool i , we maintain a hash table h in which h(u, x) is a list of pairs of the form (j, +) or (j, −) with j > i. If (j, +) is in h(u, x), this means that T encrypts M j up to round u − 1 and that the input to F u (the output of which is unknown) is x. If (j, −) is in h(u, x), this means that T decrypts M j up to round u + 1 and that the input to F u is x. Concretely, this means that h(u, x) lists the indices of (M j , C j ) pairs who need the value of F u (x) to encrypt/decrypt one more round. With this type algorithmic trick, we save the inner loop and the complexity is expected to be close to the total size of the pools:
A Heuristic Complexity Analysis of Iter
We heuristically estimate |Pool i |. First, we recall that Pool i is the subset of all minimal extensions of the elementary tuple T 1 which encrypt the first i plaintext/ciphertext pairs, restricted to the ones which are compatible with all others.
We approximate |Pool i | by N X−Y where X is the number of entries in the partial tables (i.e. the number of defined points throughout all rounds) and Y is the number of independent equations modulo N which a tuple must satisfy to be compatible. So, N −Y is the probability for a tuple to satisfy the conditions in Pool i . In other words, the N X possible tuples are decimated by a factor N Y .
To treat the fact that we start with only T 1 in Pool 1 , we decrease X by r (it means that entries defined in T 1 do not have to be enumerated as they are fixed) and we decrease Y by 2 (i.e., we consider that the (M 1 , C 1 ) pair never decimates tuples as it is always compatible by the choice of T 1 ).
Although it would be inefficient to proceed this way, we could see
We estimate the random variable X as the total number of good balls (to which we subtract the r balls corresponding to the trial of T 1 ). Conditioned to a density of good balls of θ i,j in round j, we have E(X|θ i,. ) = r j=1 θ i,j N − r. All θ i,j are random, independent, and with expected value θ i . So, E(X) = rθ i N − r.
The random variable Y is set to Y = Y 1 + Y 2 + Y 3 . The variable Y 1 counts the number of modulo N equations so that the encryption of the first i plaintexts match the corresponding ciphertext. So, Y 1 = 2(i − 1) (the first pair (M 1 , C 1 ) is satisfied by default, and each of the i − 1 other ones define two equations due to the two halves of the ciphertexts). The variable Y 2 counts the number of equations coming from pairs encrypted for all but one round. So, Y 2 counts the number of trials (out of the last q−i ones) picking exactly r−1 good balls, as they encrypt for all but one round so they define a single equation. The variable Y 3 counts the number of equations coming from pairs in (M i+1 , C i+1 ), . . . , (M q , C q ) which are fully encrypted. So, Y 3 is twice the number of trials (out of the last q − i ones) with r good balls, as they fully encrypt their corresponding pair and thus define two equations each. Conditioned to a density of good balls of θ i,j in round j, we have
All θ i,j are random and independent, with expected value θ i . Thus,
We obtain |Pool i | ≈ cns×N E(X−Y) where cns is adjusted such that |Pool 1 | = 1. Hence,
with cns ≈ 1 such that |Pool 1 | = 1.
To estimate θ i , we look at how it grows compared to θ i−1 . During the i th trial, with probability θ i−1 a picked ball is already good (so the density remains the same), and with probability 1 − θ i−1 , picking a ball defines an additional good one (so the density increases by 1 N ). 7 Therefore, on average we have
.
Assuming that the above model fits well with Iter, the expected value of log |Pool i | should match Eq. (3). However, Eq. (3) cannot represent well the expected value of |Pool i | as exponential with bigger exponents will have a huge impact on the average. This motivates an abort strategy when the pool becomes too big. The abort strategy has known and influenced many works [19] . The way we use this strategy will be discussed in Section 3.5.
Finally, the heuristic complexity is computed by . We obtain the complexity
Approximation of the Complexity
with q known plaintexts. We will see later that (5) approximates well (4). The best complexity is reached with the full codebook q = N 2 with r−2 for some β < 1.
7 It would increase with a probability a bit larger than 1 − θ i−1 , namely
if the messages are not independent but conditioned to being pairwise different. , we have T Iter * < N N−r+2 so Iter * is faster than exhaustive search on a single round function.
Iter
Optimization with larger q. We easily obtain that T Iter * in (7) is optimal with
chosen plaintexts.
Variants of Iter and Iter *
Optimized algorithm. We can speed up the algorithm by adding more points in the tuples as soon as we can compute them. Concretely, if one plaintext/ciphertext pair can be "computed" except in one or two rounds, we can deduce the values in the missing rounds and define them in the tuple. Adding x points reduce the number of iterations to define the next pool by N x .
Abort strategy. Our complexity is not an average complexity but its logarithm is an average logarithmic complexity. To avoid having a too high average complexity, we may change the algorithm to make it abort if the pool exceeds a threshold to be defined. For instance, if our theoretical formula predicts a complexity Th, to make sure that the worst case complexity does not exceed Th × N x , we set this to the threshold value. This will affect the success probability, which is 100% without the abort strategy, but may be lower for any real number x.
Other improvements. We believe that we could improve our algorithms in many ways. For instance, we could take the (M i , C i ) pairs in an optimized order so that we do not have too many new values appearing in the first and last round functions. This would decrease the number of tuples to consider.
Experimental Results
We implemented Algorithm 3 with known plaintext, r = 5, N = 8, q = 40. Our algorithm always ended with a pool limited to a correct set of full tables.
With these parameters, Eq. (3) estimates Pool 3 to be the largest, and estimates |Pool 3 | = N 2.49 . We checked over 100 executions, that log N |Pool 3 | has an average of 4.37 and a standard deviation of 0.60. This is a bad news as it is quite larger than what is predicted. More precisely, each partial function in Pool 3 has on average 2.9 defined entries, which is slightly more than the Nθ 3 ≈ 2.64 which is predicted.
8 But adjusting θ 3 to
2.9
N in Eq. (3) gives N 3.04 , which is not enough to explain the high |Pool 3 | which is observed. So, our model for the random variable X may be correct but Y may be overestimated: Iter decimates less than expected. Although we thought Pool 3 would be the largest from our theory, the largest observed pool during our experiment were Pool 4 with logarithmic size with average 5.28. This indicates that our model for Iter is not accurate.
All these problems find several explanations. First of all, our parameter N is so small that a tiny variation of number of defined entries (supposed to be θ i N) in each round has a dramatic impact on the number of tuples. Second, our approach takes the θ i as uniform in all rounds and runs although there are variations. Some rounds have more than θ i N entries and some others have less. The function we analyze is not linear in θ i . It is exponential. So, any round with more than θ i N defined entries increase the complexity quite a lot.
The good news is that using our optimized variant reduced the gap substantially. The largest Pool becomes max i log N (|Pool i |) = 3.46. Using the abort strategy with x = 1 gives a success rate of 42% and max i log N (|Pool i |) = 3.08. So, we believe that our anticipated complexities are achievable with a good success probability. However, finding a good model for decimation and for the improved algorithm remains an open question.
We summarize our experiments in the Table 2 . For the max|Pool| column is the average (logarithmically) of the largest observed pool. The logarithm is the maximum over each iteration of the average over the runs of the logarithm of the pool size. The computed average only includes successful runs, as unsuccessful ones are all on the abort threshold.
Applications
In the standards, the supported domain size of messages in FF1 and FF3 * is greater than 100 (i.e. N 2 100). For FF1 and FF3 * , the best attack is roughly Iter * for very low N, then MIT M * for larger N. More precisely, we achieve the results shown in Table 3 . Table 2 : Experimental results with parameters r = 5, N = 8, and q = 40 and with parameters r = 5, N = 10, and q = 40. The max |Pool| column reports max i E runs (log N |Pool i |): the average (logarithmically) of the largest observed pool. It is compared with Th which is derived as the largest theoretical pool size by our theory. The column opt shows whether we used the optimization trick. The abort column indicates when we used the abort strategy, and with which bound. Iter * were done without using approximations. the figures with approximation do not differ much. They are reported in the Table 4 . As an example, for FF3 * with N = 2 3 (i.e., messages have 6 bits), MIT M * uses q = 2 5 pairs (half of the codebook) and search on three points for F 0 , the entire (but one point) F 1 and F 2 , one bit of F 3 in the encryption direction, and the entire (but one point) F 7 and F 6 and one bit of F 5 in the decryption direction. This is N 3+2(N−1) × 2 N−1 = 2 58 . With Iter * , we also use q = 2 5 and the pool reaches its critical density for θ c ≈
4.4
N . The complexity is T Iter * = 2 42 . We may wonder for which N the ciphers offer a 128-bit security. Durak and Vaudenay [15] showed that this is not the case for FF3 * with N 10 and FF1 with N 7. By doing computations for Iter * , we extend this to show that FF3 * does not offer a 128-bit security for N 17, and FF1 does not offer a 128-bit security for N 11. Genuinely , we can compute in Table 5 the minimum r opt 4 of the number of rounds for which min(T MIT M * , T Iter * ) 2 s depending on s and N. Again, we computed without using our approximations. For s = 128 and s = 256, we fetch the following table.
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Even by adding a safety margin, this shows that we do not need many rounds to safely encrypt a byte (that is, N = 2 4 ) with respect to our best attacks. However, with low r, we should care about other attacks as in Table 1 . Indeed, for ⊕-FN, we recommend never to take r 7 due to the yo-yo attack [7] . For other FN, we recommend never to take r 5.
In Fig. 4 , we plot complexities for r = 8 or r = 10 and various ranges of N. The regions for T Iter * we plot have a minimum for the optimal q and a maximum for r = 10 In this table, we computed the value of q suggested by our formulas but rounded in the In this work, we analyze the security of a very specific type of FN with two branches, secure random round functions, and modular addition to analyze its security. Additionally, we consider small domains. The best attack was believed to be MITM. However, we show that partial exhaustive search can be better. Concretely, we show that the number of rounds recommended by NIST is insufficient in FF1 and FF3* for very small N.
This specific FN with the described properties has been used to build FormatPreserving Encryption and perhaps will inspire many other constructions. However, the security of FN with various properties is not clear (regardless of the significant security analyses mentioned in the introduction) and has to be investigated more. Our work shows only that a caution should be taken in order to meet the desired security level in the systems.
We proposed a new algorithm based on partial exhaustive search. We observed a gap between our heuristic complexity and experiments and suggested possible explanations. However, the problem to reduce this gap is left as an open problem. A Message Recovery Attack [4] In their recent work [4] on FFX FPE schemes, Bellare et. al. consider an FN scheme with round functions built as tweakable block ciphers. They gave a message recovery attack with data complexity larger than the domain size by using small number of messages per tweak. Basically, their attack is a differential attack that exploits the bias introduced on the left/right part of the input in Feistel networks. The idea of the bias they exploit was discovered by Patarin [22] . Namely, consider two messages
R ) as an input with same M 
L .
In [4] , more specifically, the authors consider two messages M and M encrypted under FN where they share the same right that is known to the adversary. In the attack, the adversary obtains the encryption of M and M under q tweaks, the entire message M and the shared half of the messages. At the end, the adversary outputs the unknown half of the message M with probability close to 1 by using a bias. The bias simply works as the following: Consider q pairs (M, C i ) and (M , C i ) for each tweak, if we apply modular subtraction to the left part of the C i and C i and modular addition to known left part under each tweak. The attack observes a value more likely than the others, and outputs this value as the unknown half of the message. The data complexity of the attack for an r round FN is q = 24(log(N) + 4)N (r−3) where N is the input size of the right branch in FN. The time complexity is linear in q.
B Generic Round-Function-Recovery Attack [13, 15] In their recent work, Durak and Vaudenay gave a generic round-function-recovery attack to the FN for 3, 4 and more rounds. Let's start with the attack for 2-round FN, which is relatively easier. For 2-round FN, consider input x y with output z t. The first round function is easy to compute since we know x and z, F 0 (y) = x − z. We can deduce the second round function by simply computing the F 1 (z) = y − t. With N known plaintexts/ciphertext pair, we recover the entire table of F 0 and F 1 .
The 3-round attack by Durak and Vaudenay [13, 15] is a known-plaintext attack. The idea is to fix arbitrarily the output of the round function F 0 for some inputs (refer to Fig. 5 (a) ). This gives one point of the table of F 0 . If we do so, we can apply 2-round attack. Then, we can make the pool of known points for F 0 , F 1 , F 2 increase in a yo-yo game. The time and data complexity is N to recover a good fraction of the tables and N ln N to recover them totally, with good probability.
In 4-round known-plaintext attack, the authors are interested in a special structure in a set of pairs of plaintext-ciphertext pairs with specific properties (refer to Fig. 5 (b) ). Given a pair of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, these properties are the equality on the intermediate values of a Feistel Network which are unknown as well as the known outputs. In order to distinguish the pairs of plaintext-ciphertext with these properties, the attack constructs a weighted directed graph. In this graph, a vertex is a pair of distinct pairs (xyzt, x y z t ) with t − y = t − y and z = z values. There are vertices which are called "good" when the vertices have c = c . Using good vertices, the attack deduces the equation x+F 0 (y) = x +F 0 (y ). One problem in this approach is to tell good and non-good vertices apart. For this, the attack uses a cycle finding algorithm to identify these good vertices in the graph. The data complexity of the attack is N Durak and Vaudenay [13, 15] also give a non-generic attack on FF3 (which has 8 rounds). Due to the bad tweak management in FF3, the authors could reduce the attack on 8-round FF3 construction to a 4-round FN attack and apply their generic attack. They also fix FF3 into the FF3 * scheme.
C Biased Outputs Due to the Modular Addition
Consider an FN with round functions producing an -bit output number which is reduced modulo N. For an output x ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 − 1} of a round function, we have y = x mod N. Let 2 = uN + v with v < N. Now, the probability that y = t for t ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} is Pr(y = t) = u+1 N , whereas the probability that y = t is a bit smaller for t ∈ {v, . . . , N − 1}, i.e. Pr(y = t) = u N . The bias comes from the fact that the round function typically outputs a value between 0 to 2 l − 1 (l = 128) and then it reduced to modulo N. Therefore, the output of a round function is biased to some values. We can exploit this to design an attack to FN as in the Bleichenbacher attack against DSA 11 . Assume that we first let the round function output a uniformly distributed -bit value, and then the value is reduced modulo N with N < 2 . We consider x and y as random variables. With the characteristic function of random variable y distributed among the circle in the N th roots of unity, we define the bias of y as bias(y) = E[e With the bias that we have computed, we can make (in the worst case) a distinguisher to decide if a variable has a bias. The complexity to decide if a variable has bias τ or 0 with good advantage is O(q) with q = D Generic Round-Function-Recovery Attack with Guess and Determine Method [7] In [7] , chosen-plaintext and ciphertext attacks are given for 4 and 5-round FN with modular addition. Their attack is based on a distinguisher for a 3-round FN introduced by Luby and Rackoff in [20] . For this distinguisher, refer to the Fig. 5 (a). Let the adversary have access to both encryption and decryption oracle. The adversary selects a δ, it queries the encryption oracle with arbitrary (x y) and (x+δ y), and obtains (z t) and (z t ) respectively. Then, the adversary queries (z+δ t) for decryption and obtains (x y ). The distinguisher checks if t−y = t − y to distinguish 3-round Feistel Network from a random permutation. In the 4-round attack given by Biryukov et. al. (refer to the Fig. 5 (b) ), consider a type of plaintext/ciphertext of the form (xyzt), (x y (z + δ)t ), 11 It is unpublished but cited by Vaudenay [26] and ((x + δ)yz t ) with corresponding d, d, d values in plaintexts/ciphertexts respectively. More precisely, the attacker starts with one arbitrarily fixed value of F 3 and one guessed value for F 3 (meaning that it iterates N time what follows). He sets z and z + δ such that their image by F 3 is known. For each d, it sets t and t . With the queries to the decryption oracle for (z t) and (z + δ t ), the attacker obtains (x y) and (x y ). With a query to the encryption oracle on (x + δ y), it gets (z t ). With all the obtained values, the attacker can use the 3-round property of the above defined distinguisher and can find an with N 2 data complexity.
